Case 2:	1-cv-05447-SVW -JEM Document 1	Filed 06/30/11	Page 1 of 49 Page ID #:12	
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	SEYFARTH SHAW LLP Jon D. Meer (SBN 144389) E-mail: jmeer@seyfarth.com Jonathan L. Brophy (SBN 245223) E-mail: jbrophy@seyfarth.com 2029 Century Park East, Suite 3500 Los Angeles, California 90067-3021 Telephone: (310) 277-7200 Facsimile: (310) 201-5219 Attorneys for Defendant BAXTER HEALTHCARE CORPORATION (erroneously sued BAXTER HEALTHCARE, INC.) UNITED STATE	as ΓES DISTRIC	CLERK US SOF DE CALIF. CENTRAL DES ANGELES BY: T COURT	
10	CENTRAL DIS'	TRICT OF CA	LTORUS 447SVW (R	Mλ
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12 13	Plaintiff,) HEAL	NDANT BAXTER THCARE ODATIONS NOTICE OF	
13	V.) CORPO	ORATION'S NOTICE OF VAL	
15	BAXTER HEALTHCARE, INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 THROUGH 50, Inclusive;	Compla	aint Filed: May 31, 2011	
16	Defendants.	}		
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	DEFENDANT BAXTER HEALTH		ATION'S NOTICE OF REMOV.	AL

TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA AND TO PLAINTIFF DAVID KAPLAN AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Baxter Healthcare Corporation ("BAXTER") hereby files this Notice of Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1332, 1441(a), and 1446, based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, in order to effect the removal of the above-captioned action from the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, and states that the removal is proper for the following reasons:

I. PLEADINGS, PROCESSES, AND ORDERS

- 1. On May 31, 2011 Plaintiff David Kaplan ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint for Damages in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles, entitled, "DAVID KAPLAN, Plaintiff, v. BAXTER HEALTHCARE, INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 THROUGH 50, Inclusive," ("Complaint") designated Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. SC112798.
- 2. The Complaint alleges two purported causes of action as follows: (a) "Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy," and (b) "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress."
- 3. On or about June 2, 2011, BAXTER, for the very first time, received notice of this lawsuit when it was served with Plaintiff's Summons and Complaint and accompanying documents. At no time prior to the service of this Summons and Complaint was BAXTER given notice of the pending lawsuit. All process, pleadings, notices and orders received by BAXTER in this action are attached as Exhibit A hereto, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) and are incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.

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4. On June 29, 2011, BAXTER filed its Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court. A conformed copy of the Answer is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

II. TIMELINESS OF REMOVAL

5. Without conceding that service of the Summons and Complaint was effective for purposes of 28 U.S.C. Section 1446(b), this Notice of Removal is timely because it is being filed within thirty (30) days of BAXTER's receipt of the Summons and Complaint on June 2, 2011, and within one (1) year of the commencement of this action. Thus, removal is timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a). See also Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 354-56 (1999) (removal is timely if made within 30 days after complaint is served on defendant).

III. **DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP JURISDICTION**

6. This action may be properly removed on the basis of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, in that it is a civil action between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of \$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1), 1441(a).

Α. Plaintiff's Citizenship

For diversity purposes, a person is a "citizen" of the state in which he 7. is domiciled. Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983). A party's residence is prima facie evidence of his domicile. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 19 F.3d 514, 520 (10th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has alleged that "[a]t all relevant times [he] was and is a resident of the County of Los Angeles, State of California." (Exhibit A, Complaint, ¶ 1). Plaintiff, therefore, is, and at all times since the commencement of this action has been, a citizen and resident of the State of California.

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BAXTER's Citizenship

2 8. BAXTER is now, and was at the time of the filing of this action, a citizen of a state other than California within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Section 3 4 1332(c)(1).

9. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(c), "a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business." The United States Supreme Court's decision in The Hertz Corp. v. Friend, U.S., 130 S.Ct. 1181 (2010), has now clarified the meaning of Section 1332(c). Specifically, the Supreme Court held that a corporation's "principal place of business" for determining its citizenship is the corporation's "nerve center":

We conclude that "principal place of business" is best read as referring to the place where a corporation's officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities. It is the place that Courts of Appeals have called the corporation's "nerve center." And in practice it should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters -- provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination, i.e., the "nerve center" "nerve center"

Id. at 1192 (emphasis added).

- 10. BAXTER is now, and was at all relevant times, incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware. BAXTER's headquarters are located at One Baxter Parkway, in Deerfield, Illinois. BAXTER's officers work from its headquarters in Illinois and direct, control, and coordinate BAXTER's activities from the headquarters in Illinois.
- 11. Therefore, BAXTER is not a citizen of the State of California. Rather, BAXTER is a citizen of the State of Delaware and the State of Illinois pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in The Hertz Corp., 130 S.Ct. at 1192.

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12. The presence of Doe defendants in this case has no bearing on diversity of citizenship for removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) ("For purposes of removal under this chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious

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13. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), the residence of fictitious and unknown defendants should be disregarded for purposes of establishing removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. *Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co.*, 615 F.2d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1980) (unnamed defendants are not required to join in a removal petition). Thus, the existence of Doe defendants one through fifty, inclusive, does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction.

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IV. AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY

names shall be disregarded.").

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amount in controversy requirement is satisfied because "it is more likely than not" that the amount exceeds the jurisdictional minimum of \$75,000. See Sanchez v.

While BAXTER denies any liability as to Plaintiff's claims, the

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Monumental Life Ins., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[D]efendant must

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provide evidence establishing that it is 'more likely than not' that the amount in

18 19 controversy exceeds [the threshold] amount."). As explained by the Ninth Circuit,

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"the amount-in-controversy inquiry in the removal context is not confined to the face of the complaint." *Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir.

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2004) (finding that the Court may consider facts presented in the removal petition).

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15. In determining whether a complaint meets the \$75,000 threshold of 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a), a court may consider the aggregate value of claims for

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compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorneys' fees. See, e.g., Bell v.

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Preferred Life Ass. Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238, 240 (1943) ("Where both actual and

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punitive damages are recoverable under a complaint each must be considered to

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the extent claimed in determining jurisdictional amount.") (footnote omitted);

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- Goldberg v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 678 F.2d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 945 (1982) (attorneys' fees may be taken into account to determine jurisdictional amount).
- 16. The allegations in the Complaint make clear that Plaintiff believes that the amount in controversy is well in excess of \$75,000. Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for complaining about improper sales practices. He alleges that his termination caused him to lose wages and benefits. He also alleges that the manner of the termination caused him emotional distress and alleges that the Complaint supports punitive damages.
- Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was employed by Defendant 17. from "2008," until November 4, 2010, the approximate date of Plaintiff's separation. (Exhibit A, Complaint, ¶¶ 2, 40). Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of BAXTER's purported acts, he has suffered the lost wages and other benefits. (Exhibit A, Complaint, ¶ 48). In 2010, Plaintiff had a base pay rate of \$175,000 per year, not including any commission pay. Therefore, because it has been approximately eight months since his termination (November 2010 through June 2011), and because Plaintiff was earning approximately \$14,583.33 per month, his damages thus far would total approximately \$116,666.66.
- 18. Plaintiff also seeks emotional distress damages. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of BAXTER's purported acts, he "suffer[ed] great stress and severe emotional and psychological distress both during and after his employment by Baxter." (Exhibit A, Complaint, ¶ 54). Emotional distress damages may be considered when calculating the amount in controversy even where not clearly pled in the complaint. Simmons v. PCR Tech., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Richmond v. Allstate Ins. Co., 897 F. Supp. 447, 450 (S.D. Cal. 1995) ("the vagueness of plaintiffs' pleadings with regard to emotional distress damages should not preclude this Court from noting that these damages are

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- potentially substantial"). A review of jury verdicts in California demonstrates that emotional distress awards in wrongful termination cases related to whistleblower claims and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims with similar facts to the instant case commonly exceed \$75,000. See e.g., Perez vs. Lake Avenue Congregational Church of Pasadena, 2004 WL 5066208 (Los Angeles County Sup. Ct.) (jury award of \$350,000 non-economic damages for wrongful termination claim based on whistleblower facts); Gregg Levin v. Canon Business Solutions Inc., 2009 WL 4069942 (Los Angeles County Sup. Ct.) (jury award of \$150,000 against corporate defendant on plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). (Copies of these verdicts are attached hereto as Exhibit C).
- 19. Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to attorneys' fees. (Exhibit A. Complaint, Prayer For All Causes of Action No. 5).
- 20. Plaintiff also claims that he "is entitled to an award of punitive damages." (Exhibit A, Complaint, ¶¶ 49, 55; Prayer For All Causes of Action No. 3). Requests for punitive damages must be taken into account in ascertaining the amount in controversy. Davenport v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Assn., 325 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1963). The amount of punitive damages awarded is based on the financial worth of the defendant, and is meant to punish the defendant in such a way that it will have a tangible financial consequence. Without conceding that punitive damages are appropriate or applicable here, for a defendant of BAXTER's net worth, it is obvious that a punitive damages award, if assessed, would exceed \$75,000.
- The Plaintiff's allegations of various forms of damages easily exceed 21. \$75,000. Lost wages, current and future, alone could easily amount to over \$75,000, as demonstrated above. Plaintiff also alleges that he "suffer[ed] great stress and severe emotional and psychological distress both during and after his

- employment by Baxter." (Exhibit A, Complaint, ¶ 54). Medical costs alone could easily amount to more than \$75,000. Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to attorneys' fees. Without conceding that attorneys' fees are appropriate or applicable here, such fees from inception of this case through trial will easily be more than \$75,000.
- 22. Accordingly, since the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000, the requirements for removal under 28 U.S.C. Sections 1332(a) and 1441(a) are satisfied and this Court has original jurisdiction.

V. VENUE

- 23. Plaintiff alleges that "Baxter hired plaintiff to work from his home located on Wilshire Boulevard in Los Angeles, California" (Exhibit A, Complaint, ¶ 2).
- 24. The County of Los Angeles lies within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court, Central District.
- 25. Therefore, without waiving BAXTER's right to challenge, among other things, personal jurisdiction and/or venue by way of a motion or otherwise, venue lies in the Central District of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 84(c), 1441(a), and 1446(a). This Court is the United States District Court for the district within which the State Court Action is pending. Thus, venue lies in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a).

VI. SERVICE OF NOTICE OF REMOVAL ON STATE COURT

26. A true and correct copy of this Notice of Removal will be promptly served on Plaintiff and filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles, as required under 28 U.S.C. Section 1446(d).

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1	27.	WHEREFORE, I	BAXTER	prays that this c	ivil action be	removed
2	from the Su	uperior Court of the	e State of	California, Cour	nty of Los Ang	geles, to the
3	United Stat	es District Court fo	or the Cen	tral District of C	California.	
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5	DATED: Ju	ane 30, 2011		SEYFARTH SI	HAW LLP	
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8				Jonathan J	eer L. Brophy)
9				Jonathan I Attorneys for D BAXTER HEA	LTHCARE,	INC.
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Exhibit "A"



Service of Process Transmittal

06/02/2011

CT Log Number 518615616

TO:

MARCIA MELCHIN

Baxter Healthcare Corporation

One Baxter Parkway Deerfield, IL 60015

RE:

Process Served in California

FOR:

Baxter Healthcare Corporation (Domestic State: DE)

RECEIVED

JUN **06** 2011

Baxter Law Department

ENCLOSED ARE COPIES OF LEGAL PROCESS RECEIVED BY THE STATUTORY AGENT OF THE ABOVE COMPANY AS FOLLOWS:

TITLE OF ACTION:

COURT/AGENCY:

David Kaplan, Pltf. vs. Baxter Healthcare, Inc., etc., et al., Dfts.

Name discrepancy noted.

DOCUMENT(S) SERVED:

Summons, Complaint, Notice, Stipulation Form and Proposed Order, Attachment(s)

Los Angeles County, Superior Court, Hill Street, CA Case # SC112798

NATURE OF ACTION:

Employee Litigation - Wrongful Termination - November 4, 2010 - In retaliation for

reporting the illegal off label promotion and sale of Brevibloc

ON WHOM PROCESS WAS SERVED:

C T Corporation System, Los Angeles, CA

DATE AND HOUR OF SERVICE:

By Process Server on 06/02/2011 at 14:50

JURISDICTION SERVED:

California

APPEARANCE OR ANSWER DUE:

Within 30 days after service • File written response // September 19, 2011 at 8:45

a.m. - Case Management Conference

ATTORNEY(S) / SENDER(S):

Grant A. Carslon

Friedman, Enriquez & Carlson, LLP 433 North Camden Dr.

Ste. 965 Beverly Hills, Ca 90210 310-273-0777

ACTION ITEMS:

SOP Papers with Transmittal, via Fed Ex Priority Overnight, 794825496977

Email Notification, MARCIA MELCHIN marcia_melchin@baxter.com

SIGNED:

PER: ADDRESS: C T Corporation System Nancy Flores

818 West Seventh Street Los Angeles, CA 90017

TELEPHONE:

213-337-4615

Page 1 of 1 / IM

Information displayed on this transmittat is for CT Corporation's record keeping purposes only and is provided to the recipient for quick reference. This information does not constitute a legal opinion as to the nature of action, the amount of damages, the answer date, or any information contained in the documents themselves. Recipient is responsible for interpreting said documents and for taking appropriate action. Signatures on certified mail receipts confirm receipt of package only, not contents.

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
SUMMONS (CITACION JUDICIAL)

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT: (AVISO AL DEMANDADO):

BAXTER HEALTHCARE, INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 THROUGH 50, Inclusive

YOU ARE BEING SUED BY PLAINTIFF: (LO ESTÁ DEMANDANDO EL DEMANDANTE):

DAVID KAPLAN



NOTICE! You have been sued. The court may decide against you without your being heard unless you respond within 30 days. Read the information below.

You have 30 CALENDAR DAYS after this summons and legal papers are served on you to file a written response at this court and have a copy served on the plaintiff. A letter or phone call will not protect you. Your written response must be in proper legal form if you want the court to hear your case. There may be a court form that you can use for your response. You can find these court forms and more information at the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp), your county law library, or the courthouse nearest you. If you cannot pay the filing fee, ask the court clerk for a fee waiver form. If you do not file your response on time, you may lose the case by default, and your wages, money, and property may be taken without further warning from the court.

There are other legal requirements. You may want to call an attorney right away. If you do not know an attorney, you may want to call an attorney referral service. If you cannot afford an attorney, you may be eligible for free legal services from a nonprofit legal services program. You can locate these nonprofit groups at the California Legal Services Web site (www.lawhelpcalifornia.org), the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp), or by contacting your local court or county bar association. NOTE: The court has a statutory lien for waived fees and costs on any settlement or arbitration award of \$10,000 or more in a civil case. The court's lien must be paid before the court will dismiss the case. | AVISOI Lo han demandado. Si no responde dentro de 30 días, la corte puede decidir en su contra sin escuchar su versión. Lea la información a continuación.

Tiene 30 DÍAS DE CALENDARIO después de que le entreguen esta citación y papeles legales para presentar una respuesta por escrito en esta corte y hacer que se entregue una copia al demandante. Una carta o una liamada telefónica no lo protegen. Su respuesta por escrito tiene que estar en formato legal correcto si desea que procesen su caso en la corte. Es posible que haya un formulario que usted pueda usar para su respuesta. Puede encontrar estos formularios de la corte y más información en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California (www.sucotte.ca.gov), en la biblioteca de leyes de su condado o en la corte que le quede más cerca. Si no puede pagar la cuota de presentación, pida al secretario de la corte que le dé un formulario de exención de pago de cuotas. Si no presenta su respuesta a tiempo, puede perder el caso por incumplimiento y la corte le podrá quitar su sueldo, dinero y bienes sin más advertencia.

Hay otros requisitos legales. Es recomendable que llame a un abogado inmediatamente. Si no conoce a un abogado, puede llamar a un servicio de remisión a abogados. Si no puede pagar a un abogado, es posible que cumpla con los requisitos para obtener servicios legales gratuitos de un programa de servicios legales sin fines de lucro. Puede encontrar estos grupos sin fines de lucro en el sitlo web de California Legal Services, (www.lawhelpcalifornia.org), en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California, (www.sucorte.ca.gov) o poniéndose en contacto con la corte o el colegio de abogados locales. AVISO: Por ley, la corte tiene derecho a reclamar las cuotas y los costos exentos por imponer un gravamen sobre cualquier recuperación de \$10,000 ó más de valor recibida mediante un acuerdo o una concesión de arbitraje en un caso de derecho civil. Tiene que pagar el gravamen de la corte antes de que la corte pueda desechar el caso.

The name and address of the court is:

(F) name w direction de la code est. Superior Court of California.

(El nombre y dirección de la corte es): Superior Court of California-Los Angeles

CASE NUMBER

.I. Amezcua

1725 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90401

West Judicial District

The name, address, and telephone number of plaintiffs attorney, or plaintiff without an attorney, is: (El nombre, la dirección y el número de teléfono del abogado del demandante, o del demandante que no tiene abogado, es): Friedman, Enriquez & Carlson, LLP 433 North Camden Dr., Stc. 965, Beverly Hills, CA 90210 310 273-0777

(Fecha)	MAY	31	2011	JOHN A. CLARKE	Clerk, by (Secretario)		, Deputy (Adjunto)
			de esta cita	s, use Proof of Service of Su ation use el formulario Proof TICE TO THE PERSON SE as an individual defend	of Service of Summo RVED: You are serve dant.	ons, <i>(POS-010)).</i> ed	
			3, [under: CCP 416.10 (c CCP 416.20 (c CCP 416.40 (a other (specify)	BAXTER HET Corporation) defunct corporation) association or partner	CCP 416.60 (mir CCP 416.70 (cor	nor) nservatee)
			<u></u> -	by personal delivery on	(date):		Page 1 of 1

Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of California SUM-100 [Rev. July 1, 2009]

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* '*		
1	Grant A. Carlson, Esq., State Bar No. 155933	
2	Wendy K. Shiff, Esq., State Bar No. 174616 Friedman, Enriquez & Carlson, LLP	THE PARTY OF THE P
3	433 North Camden Drive, Suite 965 Beverly Hills, California 90210	JOHN A. GLARKE, GLERK
4	Telephone (310) 273-0777 Fax (310) 273-1115	MAY 3 1 2011
5	Attorneys for Plaintiff	BY: DEPUTY
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8	SUPERIOR COURT OF TI	HE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9	FOR THE COUNT	Y OF LOS ANGELES
10		
11	DAVID KAPLAN;) Case No. SC112798
12	Plaintiff,	COMPLAINT FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF
13	vs.	PUBLIC POLICY AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
14	BAXTER HEALTHCARE, INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 THROUGH 50,) DISTRESS)
15	Inclusive;	CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE
16	Defendants.	SEP 1 9 2011 8:45 AU DO 1)
17	D A I	Date
18		RTIES Judge C. Karlan vidual who at all relevant times was and is a resident
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20	of the County of Los Angeles, State of Californ 2. Plaintiff is informed and believed.	eves and thereon alleges that defendant Baxter
21 22		anized under the laws of the state of Delaware that
23		ucts throughout the world, including the County of
24		Baxter hired plaintiff to work from his home located
25	on Wilshire Boulevard in Los Angeles, Californ	
26		hether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise
27	of the defendants named herein a Does 1 through	150, inclusive, are unknown to plaintiff at this time,
28	who therefore sues said defendants by such fict	titious names. Plaintiff will seek leave of Court to
		-1-

4. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that at all times material hereto each of the defendants, including defendants fictitiously named as Does 1 through 50, inclusive, were and now are either the agents or principals of each of the other defendants, and of each other, and in such capacity or capacities, participated in the acts and conduct alleged herein and incurred liability to plaintiff therefore.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION

A. Baxter is a Global Corporation with a Strong Presence in California

- Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that as stated on its website (www.Baxter.com), "Baxter is a global medical products and services company with expertise in medical devices, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology." Plaintiff is further informed and believes and thereon alleges that as stated on its website, Baxter employs approximately 49,700 employees throughout the world and has research, manufacturing, distribution and administrative facilities located throughout the United States as well as Argentina, Australia/New Zealand, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Germany, India/Southeast Asia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malta, Mexico, North Asia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
- Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that as stated on its website, "in 2009, Baxter sales in the U.S. totaled \$5.3 billion, 43 percent of a total of \$12.6 billion." Baxter's global headquarters are located in Deerfield, Illinois, approximately 30 miles north of Chicago. "In addition to its global headquarters . . . Baxter has maintained a strong presence in the United States. The 20,600 employees in the U.S. and Puerto Rico represent approximately 40 percent of Baxter's total employee population worldwide. In total, Baxter operates more than 80 facilities across the United States[.]"
- 7. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that as stated on its website, with "2,850 employees, California has the largest U.S. presence outside of Baxter's home base in Northern Illinois. [Furthermore,] the majority (approximately 2,400) of Baxter employees are

located at the Los Angeles, Irvine, Thousand Oaks and Westlake Village facilities in Southern California[.]"

- 8. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that as stated on its website Baxter employs thousands of employees at numerous locations in Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina and Puerto Rico.
- 9. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that as stated on its website in 2009, "Baxter's sales in Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA) were more than \$4 billion. The company's EMEA region employs more than 14,700 people and is headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland."

B. Baxter Hires Plaintiff to Increase its Sale of Brevibloc

- 10. Plaintiff is a college graduate who has worked in field sales, training, sales operations and sales management in the biotech and pharmaceutical fields for more than two decades. By 2008, plaintiff had reached the upper management level. On or about October 13, 2008, Baxter hired plaintiff as a National Sales Manager. On or about February 22, 2010, Baxter promoted plaintiff to National Sales Director. At all times, and as intended by Baxter, plaintiff worked from his home in Los Angeles, California.
- 11. One of the products that Baxter sells is called Brevibloc. Brevibloc is an IV beta-blocker that medical professionals administer before, during and after surgery to stabilize patients' blood pressure and heart rates. The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") has approved the use of Brevibloc by adult patients only. Although Baxter had been selling Brevibloc for approximately ten years when it hired plaintiff, Baxter had never sold Brevibloc at its full potential. In fact, sales of Brevibloc had been declining consistently by between 2 and 4 percent over the years prior to the date Baxter hired plaintiff.
- 12. Baxter had been selling Brevibloc through a dedicated sales force of approximately 120 sales representatives known within Baxter as the Inhalation Sales Reps ("IA Reps"). The IA Reps primarily sold a variety of inhaled gases, an anti-nausea medication and Brevibloc. The IA Reps and their various regional managers lived in and serviced specific regions and marketed and sold to hospitals within their respective regions.

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At the time Baxter hired plaintiff it was apparent to Baxter that the IA Reps were 13. generally more comfortable selling the inhaled gases, thereby causing the decline in Brevibloc sales. To remedy the declining sales of Brevibloc, Baxter was starting a separate dedicated sales force to promote Brevibloc sales.

Plaintiff Assembles the Critical Care Sales Force C.

- Baxter hired plaintiff as part of its plan to promote the sale of Brevibloc. Plaintiff's 14. job was to create a new Critical Care Sales Force ("CCSF") that would be dedicated solely to selling Brevibloc. Baxter's goal was ultimately to transfer the bulk of Brevibloc sales responsibilities from the IA Reps to the CCSF. There would, however, remain enough overlap to allow the IA Reps to continue to promote Brevibloc on those accounts CCSF did not handle.
- Plaintiff did not place any current Baxter employees on the CCSF. Rather, plaintiff 15. utilized his more than twenty years of industry experience and relationships to assemble a top-notch team. The 8 members of plaintiff's CCSF lived and worked in locations across the United States, including: Atlanta, GA; Charlotte, NC; Dallas and Houston, TX; Los Angeles, CA; Miami, FL; Philadelphia, PA; and Washington DC. The CCSF members communicated daily by phone and email and held tri-annual meetings in New York and Dallas.

Plaintiff's Critical Care Sales Force Achieves Great Success D.

- In plaintiff's first year, the CCSF increased sales of Brevibloc by 25 percent in 16. called-on accounts. The CCSF achieved this 25 percent increase while during the same time, the IA Reps' sales declined by 2 percent. Baxter was so pleased with the CCSF's success, it more than tripled the size of the CCSF to 28 sales representatives and 3 regional managers. Baxter also promoted plaintiff to the position of National Sales Director.
- In plaintiff's second year, the CCSF generated a double-digit increase in Brevibloc 17. sales, even though plaintiff was working with what was essentially an entirely new team. While the CCSF achieved this growth, the IA Reps' sales decreased by 4 percent.
- In Baxter's greed for sales revenue, Baxter senior management then required that the 18. CCSF members had to demonstrate a 45 percent growth in sales in order to receive their commissions. Baxter's senior management did not care that by placing such unrealistic demands on

the CCSF it would destroy the team members' incentive to work hard to maintain consistent results over time. Baxter's choice of greed over morality is a pervasive problem - one that ultimately led Baxter to wrongfully terminate plaintiff.

E. Plaintiff Discovers Baxter's Illegal, Off-Label Sale of Brevibloc

- 19. As noted above, the FDA approved Brevibloc for use only in adult patients. Indeed, the FDA package insert makes clear that it is not approved for use in children. Use of Brevibloc in adults is an "approved" use.
- 20. While the FDA has not approved Brevibloc for use in children, a physician may, however, use his or her own medical judgment to decide to administer Brevibloc in connection with the treatment of a child. This would be an "off label" use.
- 21. Importantly, while off label use by a physician is appropriate, it is not appropriate and is in fact illegal for Baxter to promote any off label use of a product or to pay its sales representatives commissions on off label sales. Doing so is a serious violation of federal law that could subject Baxter and its executives to monetary and/or criminal sanctions.
- 22. In or about June 2009, plaintiff added Greg Giant to the CCSF. Mr. Giant lives in the greater Chicago area and had worked for Baxter for approximately 15 years prior to joining the CCSF. Mr. Giant had worked primarily as an IA Rep but had been moved to a hybrid sales and marketing role just prior to joining the CCSF.
- 23. Plaintiff asked Mr. Giant to send him information about his accounts to determine their overall sales potential. When plaintiff reviewed Mr. Giant's accounts, he noticed there were one or possibly two children's hospitals in the Chicago area that were receiving Brevibloc. Furthermore, it was evident that Mr. Giant had been receiving commissions with respect to these sales of Brevibloc to the children's hospitals. That Mr. Giant had received commission payments was in and of itself evidence of off label promotion of Brevibloc to these accounts.
- 24. Plaintiff was extremely concerned about the illegal payment of commissions for off label use of Brevibloc and felt he had to immediately inform Baxter senior management of this problem so that it could be remedied. Plaintiff believed that this off label promotion was an anomaly and that Baxter senior management would be eager to immediately remove these accounts and -5-

prevent and further off label promotion of Brevibloc to the children's hospitals.

F. Baxter Reprimands Plaintiff for Reporting the Off-Label Sale of Brevibloc

- 25. Shortly after learning of Mr. Giant's sale of Brevibloc to children's hospitals, plaintiff sent his superior, Marie Keeley, the Vice President of Sales for Baxter's Gas and Critical Care ("GACC") Division, an email informing her of the improper payment of commissions for off label use of Brevibloc. Within the email, plaintiff stressed that any children's hospitals should be immediately removed from Mr. Giant's account list. Ms. Keeley, who lives in New Jersey, responded and indicated that she understood plaintiff's request and stated that she would take care of the problem. Plaintiff subsequently noticed that the children's hospital account was removed from Mr. Giant's account list.
- 26. Approximately two weeks later, plaintiff spoke with Ms. Keeley at a national sales meeting in New York. Although plaintiff believed he was doing his job and should be commended for recognizing a potential violation and acting quickly to remedy it, Ms. Keeley felt otherwise. At the meeting, Ms. Keeley shook her head disapprovingly and reprimanded plaintiff for reporting the violation by email. Ms. Keeley told plaintiff that now the email would be a permanent part of Baxter's records and that it would be problematic if an outside entity such as the FDA were to perform a search of Baxter's servers.
- 27. Plaintiff told Ms. Keeley that he assumed the violation was an anomaly and, for that reason, Baxter's quick action to remedy it should be sufficient to assure the FDA or any outside governing agency that Baxter was acting diligently and in good faith. Plaintiff was alarmed by this encounter, but felt that his main purpose to properly address the problem had been achieved.

G. One Year Later Plaintiff Learns that Off-Label Sales of Brevibloc are Pervasive

28. In or about early August 2010, plaintiff received a telephone call from Gretchen Burkett, who had been a member of the CCSF since approximately February 2010. Ms. Burkett, a West Coast Regional Business Manager, lives in Malibu, California and spoke with plaintiff on a weekly basis. Plaintiff was stunned when Ms. Burkett asked him "Why are the IA Reps receiving commissions on sales of Brevibloc to children's hospitals?"

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- Plaintiff responded that he was shocked by her question. Plaintiff told Ms. Burkett 29. that the year before he had alerted Baxter of this problem and was led to believe the problem had been handled. Ms. Burkett told plaintiff that she had learned about the commissions from Tim O'Neil, the San Diego IA Manager.
- When plaintiff reviewed the San Diego 1A accounts he discovered that every 30. children's hospital in San Diego County was assigned to the IA Reps and that both the IA Reps and their managers were receiving commissions from the sales as well. It became clear to plaintiff that for years, Baxter had pervasively promoted off label sales of Brevibloc.

Baxter Reprimands Plaintiff for His Second Report of Off-Label Sales of Brevibloc H.

- Shortly after his conversation with Ms. Burkett, plaintiff sent an email to Ms. Keeley 31. and the executive management teams of two different divisions advising them that the problem of off-label accounts being assigned to IA Reps had continued and that these IA Reps and their managers were being paid commissions from these accounts. Plaintiff was very worried about these illegal sales and the fact that Baxter had apparently ignored his efforts to stop these sales the year before.
- Once again, however, Baxter management responded as if plaintiff -- not the illegal 32. commissions -- were the problem. Ms. Keeley wrote back to plaintiff by email and attempted to defend Baxter's position. Plaintiff then replied to Ms. Keeley and to the executive management teams and provided examples of sales representatives who received commissions on off label sales. During this email exchange, plaintiff was mindful of Ms. Keeley's negative reaction to the use of email and sought to downplay the obvious reality that off label promotion of Brevibloc was occurring regularly.
- Approximately five minutes after plaintiff sent his last email, Scott Luce, a General 33. Manager from the greater Chicago area, sent plaintiff an email that stated "Stop all email now." Accordingly, neither plaintiff nor any other Baxter executive sent any further emails on this issue.

-7-

- 34. The following Monday, Mr. Luce telephoned plaintiff and asked him to apologize to Ms. Keeley for highlighting this issue via corporate email. Mr. Luce said, "Man, what were you thinking? You put 'off label' and 'commission pay-outs' on our server. Bob Davis [a General Manager in New Jersey] and Marie [Keeley] are furious with you!"
- 35. At this time, plaintiff finally realized that Baxter's senior executives had little concern about whether Baxter was acting legally but were more concerned about sales revenue and "covering their tracks." Plaintiff realized that his time with Baxter would be short and that he would likely be terminated soon.

I. One Month Later Baxter Terminates Plaintiff Based for a Pretextual Reason

- 36. Approximately two weeks after plaintiff's second report of improper promotion and off-label sales of Brevibloc, Baxter assigned plaintiff an "executive coach." An executive coach is an outside consultant familiar with a company or industry who is hired by the company to help an individual "fit in" and communicate more effectively within a company culture. Typically, an executive coach is hired when an executive his having difficulty working smoothly within the executive team.
- 37. Here, plaintiff was not the typical employee who required an executive coach. He had been working for Baxter for more than two years, he had assembled and grown the CCSF, and had increased the sales of Brevibloc at a fantastic rate. Plaintiff had worked and communicated smoothly and efficiently with the CCSF and the senior executives. There had never been any problem with plaintiff's performance or communication and plaintiff had never been reprimanded for anything (other than reporting off label commissions for Brevibloc).
- 38. It was clear to plaintiff that Baxter hired the executive coach solely to prevent plaintiff from reporting the off label sales of Brevibloc and to stop voicing his concerns by email. Although the senior executives told plaintiff they were hiring the executive coach because he was a valuable team member and they wanted him to continue at Baxter, it was also clear to plaintiff that hiring the executive coach was simply a step toward firing him based on a pretextual reason.
- 39. On or about November 4, 2010, plaintiff met with Megan Finnigan, a Human Resources Manager from Baxter's headquarters in Deerfield, Illinois. At the meeting, plaintiff was -8-

told that his job was in jeopardy because of some private emails he had exchanged with certain members of the CCSF two years earlier. These emails consisted of typical company venting between co-workers, akin to what might be said over a cup of coffee during a break at Starbucks. The emails did not contain any sensitive or confidential company information.

- 40. At this meeting, Ms. Finnigan, cited an obscure policy regarding the use of email for private communications. Although Ms. Finnigan indicated that the policy was explained somewhere within the mountain of initial employment documentation, plaintiff had never seen or been told about this policy either before or during his employment and he had never been told to advise the individuals he hired of the policy. In fact, to plaintiff's knowledge, no one at Baxter observed this alleged policy. Despite these facts Baxter terminated plaintiff as of November 4, 2010. It is ironic that Baxter immediately reprimanded plaintiff twice for reporting serious work-related violations by email and then turned around and fired him two years after the fact for making personal comments to his colleagues by email.
- 41. Within 24 hours after terminating plaintiff, Baxter flew the three CCSF regional managers who reported to plaintiff to its headquarters in Deerfield, Illinois. Gretchen Burkett from California, along with Bill Muldowney from Pennsylvania and Doug Pennington from Texas were put in separate conference rooms to discuss the situation. Each was told how valuable they were to Baxter and each was given a retention bonus to keep them from leaving Baxter. These regional managers were told that the decision to terminate plaintiff was a "difficult" one that had nothing to do with any performance issues.
- And, importantly, none of these regional managers was given any reason for plaintiff's termination. And, importantly, none of these regional managers was told about the alleged policy regarding private emails, even though these three individuals were some of the colleagues with whom plaintiff had exchanged the private emails. Indeed, no one at Baxter even raised the issue as an aside or as a warning to prevent any further "infractions."
- 43. To recap, therefore, even though plaintiff and all three regional managers violated the alleged policy two years earlier, Baxter, however, only terminated plaintiff -- the only person who recently reported the off label promotion of Brevibloc. Moreover, Baxter never even told the

regional managers about their alleged violation of this policy or ever mentioned the alleged policy at all. This conduct demonstrates that Baxter was never concerned about the alleged email policy. Rather, Baxter merely raised the alleged policy as a pretext to fire plaintiff in retaliation for reporting Baxter's illegal conduct.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy)

(Against all Defendants)

- 44. Plaintiff incorporates and realleges herein paragraphs 1 through 43 as if set forth fully herein.
- 45. On or about November 4, 2010, after reprimanding plaintiff for reporting the illegal off label promotion and sale of Brevibloc for use in children and in violation of public policy, defendants wrongfully terminated plaintiff from his employment with Baxter.
- 46. Defendants reprimanded and ultimately terminated plaintiff for reporting the illegal off label promotion and sale of Brevibloc for use in children and not for the manufactured, pretextual reason they claim.
- Pefendants' termination of plaintiff violates fundamental public policy for at least two reasons. First, it violates the fundamental public policy against the promotion and sale of drugs and pharmaceutical products for off label or unapproved uses under federal law and embodied, *inter alia*, in the United States Code and the Code of Federal Regulations. *See e.g.* 21 U.S.C. § 331; 21 C.F.R. §§ 99.1 *et seq.* and 21 C.F.R. §§ 300 *et seq.* Second, it violates the fundamental public policy against retaliation by an employer against an employee who refuses to engage in or otherwise reports illegal conduct under California law. *See e.g.* Cal. Labor Code §§ 1102.5, 2922 and 6310. *See also Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield*, Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 172-74 (1980).
- 48. Defendants' termination of plaintiff directly and proximately caused plaintiff to suffer damages in an amount according to proof at trial, including but not limited to, statutory damages, lost wages and other benefits, emotional distress and pain and suffering.

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49. Defendants' termination of plaintiff was malicious and oppressive within the parameters of Cal. Civ. Code § 3294, and was instigated, encouraged, ratified and condoned by a managing agent, thereby justifying the imposition of punitive damages against defendants.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)

(Against all Defendants)

- 50. Plaintiff incorporates and realleges herein paragraphs 1 through 43 as if set forth fully herein.
- 51. As set forth fully above, while employed by Baxter, plaintiff reported the off label promotion and sale of Brevibloc for use in children. Defendants reprimanded and ultimately terminated plaintiff in retaliation for reporting this illegal conduct. Defendants did not terminate plaintiff for the manufactured, pretextual reason they claim.
- 52. Defendants' retaliatory conduct for plaintiff's reporting the illegal off label promotion and sale of Brevibloc for use in children was outrageous and beyond all bounds of human decency.
- 53. By engaging in this retaliatory conduct, defendants intended to cause plaintiff to suffer emotional distress or in the alternative, defendants acted with reckless disregard of the probability that plaintiff would suffer emotional distress when they reprimanded and terminated him for reporting the off label promotion and sale of Brevibloc for use in children.
- 54. Defendants' retaliatory conduct for plaintiff's reporting the illegal off label promotion and sale of Brevibloc was a substantial factor in and, in fact, directly and proximately caused plaintiff to suffer great stress and severe emotional and psychological distress both during and after his employment by Baxter, in an amount to be proven at trial.
- 55. Defendants' retaliatory conduct was malicious and oppressive within the parameters of Cal. Civ. Code § 3294, thereby justifying the imposition of punitive damages against defendants. WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment against defendants as follows:

For All Causes of Action:

1. General damages in a sum according to proof, but no less than the jurisdictional minimum of this Court;

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1	2.	Special damages, in a sum according to proof;
2	3.	Punitive damages, pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 3294;
3	4.	Costs of suit incurred;
4	5.	Attorney's fees incurred in the prosecution of this action; and
5	6.	For such other and further relief as is just and proper.
6		Friedman, Eproquez & Carlson, LLP
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8		By: Grant A. Carlson, Esq. (Attorneys for Plaintiff
9		Attorneys for Plaintin
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		COMPLAINT

CASE NO.	• •	SC112798
	CASE NO.	3011×100

NOTICE OF CASE ASSIGNMENT TO INDIVIDUAL CALENDAR COURT

TO PLAINTIFFS AND PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEYS OF RECORD or PLAINTIFFS IN PRO PER:

be as	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND YO signed to a Judge for all purposes, including Judge C. Karlan	ing trial, as follows	
×	Santa Monica Courthouse 1725 Main Street Santa Monica, CA 90401		Judge Richard A. Stone Beverly Hills Courthouse Department WE-X 9355 Burton Way Beverly Hills, CA 90210

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF OR COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF SHALL GIVE NOTICE OF THIS ALL-PURPOSE CASE ASSIGNMENT by serving a copy of this Notice on all parties to this action at the time the Summons and Complaint are served, or, if not a served party, then when such party (including any cross-defendant or complainant-in-intervention) appears in the action.

CASE MANAGEMENT REVIEW AND CONFERENCE: Upon the filing of the Complaint, a Case Management Review and Conference will be calendared for hearing in the Court to which the case is assigned. The hearing date will be stamped upon the face of the Complaint. Plaintiff shall give notice of the Case Management Review and Conference to all named parties in conjunction with service of the Summons and Complaint and include any later appearing party such as a cross-defendant or complainant-in-intervention served within this time period. Proof of service must be brought to the hearing if not previously filed. Failure to timely file proof of service of Summons and Complaint within 60 days after filing the Complaint (CRC 3.110) may result in an Order to Show Cause re sanctions being issued. (CRC 3.110(f).)

If a case is assigned to Department X, located in the Beverly Hills Courthouse, all documents, pleadings, motions, and papers filed subsequent to the original Complaint shall be filed directly in the courtroom stamped upon the Complaint.

Pursuant to CRC 3.725, no later than 15 calendar days before the date set for the Case Management Conference or Review, each party must file a Case Management Statement and serve it on all other parties in the case. In lieu of each party's filing a separate Case Management Statement, any two or more parties may file a joint Statement.

The subjects to be considered at the Case Management Conference shall include the following (CRC Rule 3.727):

- (1) Whether there are any related cases;
- Whether all parties named in the Complaint or Cross-Complaint have been served, have appeared, or have been dismissed;
- (3) Whether any additional parties may be added or the pleadings may be amended;
- Whether, if the case is a limited civil case, the economic litigation procedures under Code of Civil Procedure Section 90 et seq. will apply to it or the party intends to bring a motion to exempt the case from these procedures;
- (5) Whether any other matters (e.g., the bankruptcy of a party) may affect the Court's jurisdiction or processing of the case;
- Whether the parties have stipulated to, or the case should be referred to, judicial arbitration in courts having a judicial arbitration program or to any other form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) process and, if so, the date by which the judicial arbitration or other ADR process must be completed;
- (7) Whether an early settlement conference should be scheduled and, if so, on what date;
- (8) Whether discovery has been completed and, if not, the date by which it will be completed;
- (9) What discovery issues are anticipated;
- (10) Whether the case should be bifurcated or a hearing should be set for a motion to bifurcate under Code of Civil Procedure Section 598;
- (11) Whether there are any Cross-Complaints that are not ready to be set for trial and, if so, whether they should be severed;
- Whether the case is entitled to any statutory preference and, if so, the statute granting the preference;
- (13) Whether a jury trial is demanded and, if so, the identity of each party requesting a jury trial;

ME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NUMBER ATTORNEYS	FILE STAMP
tomey(s) for:	
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFO	ORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
	CASE NUMBER
PLAINTIFF(S).	
vs.	STIPULATION AND ORDER RE BINDING ARBITRATION
DEFENDANT(S).	Status Conference Date: At a.m. in Department
THE PARTIES SHOULD CONSIDER BINDING ARBITRATION. COURT APPEARANCES. THE ARBITRATION IS PROVIDED A	BINDING ARBITRATION PROVIDES FINALITY AND ELIMINATES IT NO COST TO THE PARTIES. IF THIS STIPULATION IS SIGNED AND IT DAYS PRIOR TO THE DATE SET FOR THE STATUS CONFERENCE,
FILED DIRECTLY IN THE ABOVE DEPARTMENT, FIVE COOK	DAISTRONTO
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) INFORMATION PACKAGE

[CRC 3.221 Information about Alternative Dispute Resolution]

For additional ADR information and forms visit the Court ADR web application at www.lasuperiorcourt.org (click on ADR).

The plaintiff shall serve a copy of this Information Package on each defendant along with the complaint (CivII only).

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is the term used to describe all the other options available for settling a dispute which once had to be settled in court. ADR processes, such as arbitration, mediation, neutral evaluation (NE), and settlement conferences, are less formal than a court process and provide opportunities for parties to reach an agreement using a problem-solving approach.

There are many different kinds of ADR. All of them utilize a "neutral", an impartial person, to decide the case or help the parties reach an agreement.

Mediation:

In mediation, a neutral person called a "mediator" helps the parties try to reach a mutually acceptable resolution of the dispute. The mediator does not decide the dispute but helps the parties communicate so they can try to settle the dispute themselves. Mediation leaves control of the outcome with the parties.

Cases for Which Mediation May Be Appropriate

Mediation may be particularly useful when parties have a dispute between or among family members, neighbors, or business partners. Mediation is also effective when emotions are getting in the way of resolution. An effective mediator can hear the parties out and help them communicate with each other in an effective and nondestructive manner.

Cases for Which Mediation May Not Be Appropriate

Mediation may not be effective if one of the parties is unwilling to cooperate or compromise. Mediation also may not be effective if one of the parties has a significant advantage in power over the other. Therefore, it may not be a good choice if the parties have a history of abuse or victimization.

In arbitration, a neutral person called an "arbitrator" hears arguments and evidence from each side and then decides the outcome of the dispute. Arbitration is less formal than a trial, and the rules of evidence are often relaxed. Arbitration may be either "binding" or "nonbinding." Binding arbitration means that the parties waive their right to a trial and agree to accept the arbitrator's decision as final. Nonbinding arbitration means that the parties are free to request a trial if they do not accept the arbitrator's decision.

Cases for Which Arbitration May Be Appropriate

Arbitration is best for cases where the parties want another person to decide the outcome of their dispute for them but would like to avoid the formality, time, and expense of a trial. It may also be appropriate for complex matters where the parties want a decision-maker who has training or experience in the subject matter of the dispute

Cases for Which Arbitration May Not Be Appropriate

If parties want to retain control over how their dispute is resolved, arbitration, particularly binding arbitration, is not appropriate. In binding arbitration, the parties generally cannot appeal the arbitrator's award, even if it is not supported by the evidence or the law. Even in nonbinding arbitration, if a party requests a trial and does not receive a more favorable result at trial than in arbitration, there may be penalties.

Neutral Evaluation:

In neutral evaluation, each party gets a chance to present the case to a neutral person called an "evaluator." The evaluator then gives an opinion on the strengths and weaknesses of each party's evidence and arguments and about how the dispute could be resolved. The evaluator is often an expert in the subject matter of the dispute. Although the evaluator's opinion is not binding, the parties typically use it as a basis for trying to negotiate a resolution of the dispute.

Cases for Which Neutral Evaluation May Be Appropriate

Neutral evaluation may be most appropriate in cases in which there are technical issues that require special expertise to resolve or the only significant issue in the case is the amount of damages.

Cases for Which Neutral Evaluation May Not Be Appropriate

Neutral evaluation may not be appropriate when there are significant personal or emotional barriers to resolving the dispute.

Settlement Conferences:

Settlement conferences may be either mandatory or voluntary. In both types of settlement conferences, the parties and their attorneys meet with a judge or a neutral person called a "settlement officer" to discuss possible settlement of their dispute. The judge or settlement officer does not make a decision in the case but assists the parties in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case and in negotiating a settlement. Settlement conferences are appropriate in any case where settlement is an option. Mandatory settlement conferences are often held close to the date a case is set for trial.

LAADR 005 (05-09) LASC Approved

Exhibit "B"

13500102v.2

TO PLAINTIFF AND TO HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

Defendant BAXTER HEALTHCARE CORPORATION ("Defendant"), erroneously sued as BAXTER HEALTHCARE, INC., hereby answers the Unverified Complaint of DAVID KAPLAN ("Plaintiff") as follows:

Pursuant to the provisions of California Code of Civil Procedure § 431.30(d), Defendant denies, generally and specifically, each and every allegation, statement, matter and each purported cause of action contained in the Complaint, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing, denies, generally and specifically, that Plaintiff has been damaged in the manner or sums alleged, or in any way at all, by reason of any acts or omissions of Defendant.

Defendant answers only on behalf of itself and asserts the affirmative defenses herein.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

In further answer to the COMPLAINT, and as separate and distinct affirmative defenses. Defendant alleges the following defenses. In asserting these defenses, Defendant does not assume the burden of proof as to matters that, pursuant to law, are Plaintiff's burden to prove.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure to State a Cause of Action Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted)

1. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action and fails to state a claim upon which any relief can be granted.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Statute of Limitations)

2. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 337(1), 338 (b), (c), and (d); 340.

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THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

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(Failure to State Sufficient Facts to Constitute A Cause of Action)

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Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted because California law precludes Plaintiff from

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bringing tort claims arising out of the employment relationship.

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FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

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(Workers' Compensation Exclusivity)

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Plaintiff's Complaint, and each allegation contained therein, is barred, in whole or in part, to the extent Plaintiff seeks recovery for alleged physical or emotional injuries, based on

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exclusive remedies available under the applicable provisions of the California Workers'

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Compensation Act, Cal. Labor Code §§ 3600 et seq., which preempts such claims.

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FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

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(Failure to Plead Facts Supporting a Claim of Emotional Distress)

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5. Any claim for alleged emotional or mental distress or suffering, discomfort, humiliation and embarrassment should be stricken from Plaintiff's COMPLAINT because

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Plaintiff has failed to plead with particularity any facts supporting such a claim, as required by

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law.

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SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Collateral Source)

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Plaintiff's Complaint, and each allegation contained therein, is barred to the 6.

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extent that Plaintiff has not alleged any tangible or medical evidence of emotional distress, pain,

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anxiety or suffering as a result of any conduct alleged in the COMPLAINT. Alternatively, to the

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extent that any alleged emotional distress, pain, or anxiety was suffered, it was caused by a

collateral source other than the conduct of Defendant.

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SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

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(At-Will Employment)

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7. Plaintiff's Complaint, and all causes of action contained therein, is barred to the extent that Plaintiff was an at-will employee, and his terms and conditions of employment could

DEFENDANT BHC'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT

1	be modified or changed at any time, with or without notice, and with or without cause, as
2	provided under section 2922 of the California Labor Code. Similarly, Plaintiff's employment
3	could be terminated at any time with or without notice, and with or without cause, as provided
4	under section 2922 of the California Labor Code.
5	EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
6	(Good Cause)
7	8. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, fails
8	to state claims upon which relief can be granted because any decisions made with respect to
9	Plaintiff's employment were based upon good cause.
10	NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
11	(Good Faith)
12	9. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, is
13	barred in whole or in part because Defendant had an honest, reasonable, and good-faith belief in
14	the facts on which it based any acts, omissions, and/or conduct taken with respect to Plaintiff.
15	TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
15 16	TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (No Violation of Public Policy)
16	(No Violation of Public Policy)
16 17	(No Violation of Public Policy) 10. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, are
16 17 18	(No Violation of Public Policy) 10. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, are barred to the extent that Plaintiff's allegations of violation of public policy do not identify a
16 17 18 19	(No Violation of Public Policy) 10. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, are barred to the extent that Plaintiff's allegations of violation of public policy do not identify a fundamental public policy based on a constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision applicable
16 17 18 19 20	(No Violation of Public Policy) 10. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, are barred to the extent that Plaintiff's allegations of violation of public policy do not identify a fundamental public policy based on a constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision applicable to Defendant.
16 17 18 19 20 21	(No Violation of Public Policy) 10. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, are barred to the extent that Plaintiff's allegations of violation of public policy do not identify a fundamental public policy based on a constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision applicable to Defendant. ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	(No Violation of Public Policy) 10. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, are barred to the extent that Plaintiff's allegations of violation of public policy do not identify a fundamental public policy based on a constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision applicable to Defendant. ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (No Protected Activity)
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	(No Violation of Public Policy) 10. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, are barred to the extent that Plaintiff's allegations of violation of public policy do not identify a fundamental public policy based on a constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision applicable to Defendant. ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (No Protected Activity) 11. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, are
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	(No Violation of Public Policy) 10. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, are barred to the extent that Plaintiff's allegations of violation of public policy do not identify a fundamental public policy based on a constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision applicable to Defendant. ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (No Protected Activity) 11. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, are barred to the extent that Plaintiff's allegations of wrongful termination are not based upon any
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	(No Violation of Public Policy) 10. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, are barred to the extent that Plaintiff's allegations of violation of public policy do not identify a fundamental public policy based on a constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision applicable to Defendant. ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (No Protected Activity) 11. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, are barred to the extent that Plaintiff's allegations of wrongful termination are not based upon any

TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 1 (Equal Dignities) 2 Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, are 12. 3 barred by the equal dignities rule. 4 THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 5 (Plaintiff's Negligence) 6 Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, fails 13. 7 to state claims upon which relief can be granted because Plaintiff is guilty of a culpable degree of 8 negligence and is therefore liable to his employer for the damage caused to his employer. Cal. 9 Lab. Code § 2865. 10 FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 11 (Failure to Conform to Usage of Place of Performance) 12 Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, fails 14. 13 to state claims upon which relief can be granted because Plaintiff failed to perform his services in 14 conformity to the usage of the place. Cal. Lab. Code § 2857. 15 FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 16 (Degree of Skill and Failure to Use Skill Possessed) 17 15. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, fails 18 to state claims upon which relief can be granted because Plaintiff failed to use ordinary care and 19 diligence in the performance of his employment. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2858, 2859. 20 SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 21 (Plaintiff's Willful Breach) 22 23

16. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted because Plaintiff willfully breached his duties as an employee, habitually neglected his duties, and/or failed to perform his duties. Cal. Lab. Code § 2924.

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SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure to Comply with Employer's Directions)

17. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, is barred in whole or in part because Plaintiff failed to substantially comply with all the directions of his employer and its agents, representatives, employees, and/or supervisors concerning the services upon which he was engaged, and such obedience was neither impossible, nor unlawful, and did not impose new and/or unreasonable burdens upon Plaintiff.

EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Plaintiff's Conduct on the Job)

18. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action contained therein, is barred to the extent that any act, decision or conduct taken toward Plaintiff was based on Plaintiff's conduct on the job.

NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Statute of Frauds)

19. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted because Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of frauds.

TWENTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Laches)

20. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, are barred under the doctrine of laches.

TWENTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Waiver)

21. Plaintiff, by reason of his conduct and actions, has waived the right, if any, to assert the claims in the Complaint and all purported causes of action contained therein.

TWENTY-SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Estoppel) 22. Plaintiff is estopped by his own actions and course of conduct from pursuing the

claims of the Complaint and all purported causes of action contained therein.

TWENTY-THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Unclean Hands)

23. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, are barred under the doctrine of unclean hands.

TWENTY-FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Lack of Proximate Cause and Failure to Exercise Ordinary Care)

24. If Plaintiff sustained any loss, injury, damage or detriment as alleged in the Complaint, the loss, injury, damage or detriment was caused and contributed to by Plaintiff's own actions in that he did not exercise ordinary care on his own behalf and in the performance of his employment at the times and places alleged in the Complaint, and Plaintiff's actions and omissions proximately contributed to the loss, injury and detriment alleged by Plaintiff, therefore Plaintiff's recovery, if any, should be reduced in proportion to the percentage of Plaintiff's negligence or in proportion to his fault.

TWENTY-FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure to Mitigate Damages)

25. Plaintiff has failed to mitigate or reasonably attempt to mitigate his damages as required by law.

TWENTY-SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure to Plead Facts Sufficient to Support Punitive Damages)

26. Plaintiff is not entitled to recover punitive or exemplary damages herein, and any allegations with respect thereto should be stricken because Plaintiff has failed to plead and/or prove Facts sufficient to support allegations of malice, oppression, or fraud. Cal. Civ. Code § 3294.

TWENTY-SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(No Liability for Punitive Damages)

27. Defendant is not liable for punitive damages because neither Defendant nor any of its officers, directors, or managing agents committed any alleged oppressive, willful, fraudulent, or malicious acts, authorized or ratified such alleged acts, or had advanced knowledge of the unfitness of any employee or employees who allegedly committed such an act, or employed any such employee or employees with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. Cal. Civ. Code § 3294 (b).

TWENTY-EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Mixed Motive)

Plaintiff's claims are barred, or he is precluded from recovering damages, to the extent that if Defendant's actions, which are the subject of plaintiff's claim, were actually motivated by both lawful and unlawful reasons (which Defendant denies), Defendant's legitimate reasons, standing alone, would have induced it to make the same decision it reached.

TWENTY-NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(After-Acquired Evidence)

29. Plaintiff's claims are barred, or he is precluded from recovering damages, to the extent that Defendant learns through after-acquired evidence that Plaintiff engaged in any fraud or other misconduct that, if known, would have caused him to be terminated.

THIRTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Privilege)

30. Defendant asserts that any and all acts alleged to have been committed by Defendant or Defendant's agents were absolutely or qualifiedly privileged.

THIRTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Reservation of Rights)

31. Plaintiff's Complaint for Damages and each cause of action contained therein is plead in a conclusory and vague manner, thereby making it impossible for Defendant to fully anticipate all defenses that may be available with respect to each of Plaintiff's claims.

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Accordingly, Defendant reserves the right to add additional affirmative defenses that are 1 2 applicable to this matter, at a subsequent time in the case. 3 **PRAYER** 4 WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment as follows: 5 I. That Complaint, and each purported cause of action contained therein, be 6 dismissed with prejudice, and that judgment be entered for Defendant; 7 2. That Plaintiff take nothing; 8 3. That Defendant be awarded its costs of suit herein; and That Defendant be awarded such other and further relief as the court may deem 9 4. just and proper. 10 11 DATED: June 29, 2011 12 SEYFARTH SHAW LLP 13 14 15 Johathan L. Brophy Attorneys for Defendant 16 BAXTER HEALTHCARE CORPORATION 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

1		PROOF OF SERVICE					
2	STAT	TE OF CALIFORNIA					
3	COUN	NTY OF LOS ANGELES) ss					
4 5	I am a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action. My business address is 2029 Century Park East, Suite 3500, Los Angeles, California 90067-3021. On June 29, 2011, I served the within documents:						
6	DEFENDANT BAXTER HEALTHCARE CORPORATION'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT						
7 8 9		I sent such document from facsimile machine (310) 201-5219 on June 29, 2011. I certify that said transmission was completed and that all pages were received and that a report was generated by facsimile machine (310) 201-5219 which confirms said transmission and receipt. I, thereafter, mailed a copy to the interested party(ies) in this action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelope(s) addressed to the parties listed below.					
11	X	by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Los Angeles, addressed as set forth below.					
12		by personally delivering the document(s) listed above to the person(s) at the address(es) set forth below.					
13 14 15		by placing the document(s) listed above, together with an unsigned copy of this declaration, in a sealed Federal Express envelope with postage paid on account and deposited with Federal Express at Los Angeles, California, addressed as set forth below. by transmitting the document(s) listed above, electronically, via the e-mail addresses set					
16 17 18 19 20		forth below. Grant A. Carlson, Esq. Wendy K. Shiff, Esq. FRIEDMAN, ENRIQUEZ & CARLSON, LLP 433 North Camden Drive, Suite 965 Beverly Hills, CA 90210 Telephone: (310) 273-0777 Facsimile: (310) 273-1115					
21 22 23	I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.						
24	is true	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above and correct.					
25		Executed on June 29, 2011, at Los Angeles, California.					
26 27		Care Colon					
28		Patricia E. Haden					
	<u> </u>	PROOF OF SERVICE					

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Exhibit "C"

Westlaw

48 Trials Digest 9th 13

Page 1

48 Trials Digest 9th 13 (Cal.Superior), 2004 WL 5066208 For Dockets See <u>BC278495</u>

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Superior Court, Los Angeles County, California.

Perez vs. Lake Avenue Congregational Church of Pasadena

TOPIC:

Synopsis: Schoolteacher alleges retaliatory termination for whistleblowing

Case Type: Labor & Employment; Whistleblower; Labor & Employment; Termination/Constructive Discharge; Labor & Employment; Violation of Public Policy; Defamation; Slander; Contracts; Breach; Labor & Employment; Breach of Contract

DOCKET NUMBER: BC278495

STATE: California COUNTY: Los Angeles

Verdict/Judgment Date: February 5, 2004

JUDGE: Soussan G. Bruguera

ATTORNEYS:

Plaintiff: <u>Donald Conway</u>, Shegerian & Associates Inc., Beverly Hills.; <u>N. Nick Ebrahimian</u>, Shegerian & Associates Inc., Beverly Hills.; <u>Alfred Hakim</u>, Law Offices of Alfred Hakim, Los Angeles.; <u>Carney R. Shegerian</u>, Shegerian & Associates Inc., Beverly Hills.

Defendant: <u>Steven R. Bangerter</u>, Cooksey, Toolen, Gage, Duffy & Woog, Costa Mesa.; <u>Todd A. James</u>, Cooksey, Toolen, Gage, Duffy & Woog, Costa Mesa.

SUMMARY:

Verdict/Judgment: Plaintiff

Verdict/Judgment Amount: \$970,001

Range: \$500,000-\$999,999

Wrongful termination: \$120,000 economic; \$350,000 non-economic. Defamation: \$1 past economic; \$125,000

future economic; \$250,000 past non-economic; \$125,000 future non-economic.

Trial Type: Jury

Trial Length: Not reported. Deliberations: Not reported. Jury Poll: Not reported.

EXPERTS:

48 Trials Digest 9th 13 Page 2

Plaintiff: Not reported. Defendant: Not reported.

TEXT: CASE INFORMATION FACTS/CONTENTIONS

According to Defendant: Plaintiff Deborah Perez worked for defendants Lake Avenue Congregational Church of Pasadena dba Lake Avenue Church School and Kohar Jarlekian as a teacher of minor children for four years. She alleged that defendants unlawfully terminated her employment in response to her making complaints to both defendants and the state government about the illegally high number of students being enrolled in her classroom by defendants. Plaintiff alleged that the teacher-to-student ratio was too high as a result of defendants' financial motivations. Plaintiff further alleged that her complaints about safety problems at defendants' facility were another illegal motivating factor in the termination of her employment. Plaintiff further alleged that defendants defamed her by speaking falsely and negatively about her work performance and skills and breached their implied and express employment contract with her.

Defendants denied all of plaintiff's allegations. Defendants denied that any actions on their part were taken illegally and alleged that plaintiff was fired from her job because of poor work performance.

CLAIMED INJURIES

According to Defendant: Emotional distress.

CLAIMED DAMAGES

According to Defendant: Not reported.

SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS

According to Defendant: Not reported.

Trials Digest, A Thomson/West business

Los Angeles County Superior Court/Downtown

48 Trials Digest 9th 13 (Cal.Superior), 2004 WL 5066208

END OF DOCUMENT

Westlaw

2009 WL 4069942 Page 1

2009 WL 4069942 (Cal.Superior)

For Opinion See <u>2009 WL 6411755</u> (Trial Order), <u>2009 WL 2000640</u> (Trial Order), <u>2009 WL 2000641</u> (Trial Order)

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Superior Court, Los Angeles County, California.

Gregg Levin v. Canon Business Solutions Inc., Canon U.S.A. Inc., Jack Ketchum, John Focarino, Rolando Nuestro and Michael Cerame

No. BC390728

DATE OF VERDICT/SETTLEMENT: November 06, 2009

TOPIC: EMPLOYMENT - WRONGFUL TERMINATION - INTENTIONAL TORTS - FALSE IMPRISON-MENT - PRIVACY - INVASION OF PRIVACY - INTENTIONAL TORTS - INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS - NEGLIGENCE - NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS Fired Employee Sued Company for False Imprisonment, Distress

SUMMARY:

RESULT: Verdict-Plaintiff Award Total: \$207,235

The jury found in favor of Levin against Cerame, Solutions and CUSA on the claims for false imprisonment, invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Judgment was entered against Solutions and CUSA in the amount of \$1,810.25 each on the causes of action for false imprisonment and invasion of privacy, and against Cerame for the total of \$3,614.50 on the same claims.

EXPERT WITNESSES:

Plaintiff: <u>Anthony E. Reading</u>, Ph.D.; Psychology/Counseling; Beverly Hills, CA <u>Richard B. Danehy</u>; Human Resources Policies; Santa Barbara, CA

Defendant: Francine Kulick, Ph.D.; Psychological Injuries; Santa Monica, CA

ATTORNEYS:

Plaintiff: Martin D. Singer; Lavely & Singer; Los Angeles, CA (Gregg Levin); William J. Briggs; Lavely & Singer, PC; Los Angeles, CA (Gregg Levin); Todd S. Eagan; Lavely & Singer, PC; Los Angeles, CA (Gregg Levin)

Defendant: Joseph W. Hammell; Dorsey & Whitney, LLP; Minneapolis, MN (Canon Business Solutions Inc., Canon LLS A. Inc. Joseph W. Stehum, John Focgring, Polando Nuestro); Nicole Hagning: Dorsey & Whitney, LLP; Minneapolis, MN (Canon Business Solutions Inc., Canon LLS A. Inc. Joseph W. Stehum, John Focgring, Polando Nuestro); Nicole Hagning: Dorsey & Whitney, LLP; Minneapolis, MN (Canon Business Solutions Inc., Canon Business Solution

U.S.A. Inc., Jack Ketchum, John Focarino, Rolando Nuestro); Nicole Haaning; Dorsey & Whitney, LLP; Minneapolis, MN (Canon Business Solutions Inc., Canon U.S.A. Inc., Jack Ketchum, John Focarino, Rolando Nuestro); Jessica Linehan; Dorsey & Whitney, LLP; Minneapolis, MN (Canon Business Solutions Inc., Canon Business Solutions Inc., Canon U.S.A. Inc., Canon U.S.A. Inc., Jack Ketchum, John Focarino, John Focarino, Rolando Nuestro, Rolando Nuestro); Caroline L. Dasovich; Caroline L. Dasovich & Associates; El Segundo, CA (Michael Cerame)

JUDGE: Michael L. Stern

2009 WL 4069942 Page 2

RANGE AMOUNT: \$200,000-499,999

STATE: California COUNTY: Los Angeles

INJURIES: Levin sought unspecified monetary damages for emotional distress, which he claimed was intentional on the part of the defendants, via accusations, threats, false imprisonment and invasion of privacy.

Facts:

On or around March 21, 2008, plaintiff Gregg Levin, 45, was terminated from his color copy service technician position at Canon Business Solutions Inc.

On March 17, Levin was called to meet with company managers, two internal auditors and private security consultant Michael Cerame at the Solutions office in Calabasas.

According to Levin, Cerame demanded to be taken to the plaintiff's home. Levin initially refused, but then complied when Cerame threatened him with termination and embezzlement charges.

Levin claimed that once they arrived at his home, the men raided his house and garage, and that one Solutions employee looked through his children's room for company property. Levin claimed that the men left his home after he called the police. A few days later, he was out of a job.

Levin sued Solutions, parent company Canon USA Inc. (CUSA) and Cerame, as well as Solutions employees Jack Ketchum, John Focarino and Rolando Nuestro. He alleged **wrongful termination** in violation of public policy, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, violation of the Bane Civil Rights Act, defamation, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The plaintiff claimed that he regularly stored company property at his home with his employer's permission. He alleged that the company soon began to threaten him with criminal charges if he didn't confess to stealing the property.

Levin alleged that Solutions wrongfully terminated him in **retaliation** for calling the police. He further alleged false imprisonment for being forced to ride in the same car as Cerame to his home, where the alleged raid took place. He then claimed that Cerame and the three employees unlawfully searched his home, an invasion of privacy.

The defense responded that Solutions received a tip from Levin's ex-wife that he was stealing company property, storing it in his garage, selling it and/or using it for his own copy-repair business. Based on this information, the company hired Cerame to investigate the matter.

The defense also claimed that Levin voluntarily agreed to enter Cerame's car and allow the defendants to enter and search his garage. The defendants further claimed that they only searched his garage, and that Levin himself requested that another Solutions employee walk through his house with him to verify that there was no company property inside.

On summary judgment prior to trial, the court dismissed the plaintiff's wrongful termination, Bane Civil Rights Act and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. During trial, the plaintiff's claims for defamation and tortious interference and all claims against Nuestro were dismissed.

The defense filed a cross-complaint against Levin for various claims, including conversion, interference with contractual relations and prospective economic advantage, fraud, breach of contract and breach of various labor code provisions.

The defense denied that Levin was entitled to damages for emotional distress.

On the cross-complaint, Solutions sought damages, including wages paid to Levin while he was allegedly stealing from the company.

On the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, judgment was entered against Solutions in the amount of \$50,000 and against CUSA for \$150,000.

Levin's final award was \$207,235, including costs.

The jury found in favor of Solutions employees Ketchum and Focarino on all claims, and also awarded Solutions \$1,840 against Levin on its cross-complaint.

ALM Properties, Inc.

Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Central

PUBLISHED IN: VerdictSearch California Reporter Vol. 8, Issue 46

2009 WL 4069942 (Cal.Superior)

END OF DOCUMENT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR DISCOVERY

This case has been assigned to District Judge Stephen V. Wilson and the assigned discovery Magistrate Judge is John E. McDermott.

The case number on all documents filed with the Court should read as follows:

CV11- 5447 SVW (JEMx)

Pursuant to General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the Magistrate Judge has been designated to hear discovery related motions.

[X]	Western Division 312 N. Spring St., Rm. G-8	Southern Division 411 West Fourth St., Rm. 1-053	Eastern Division 3470 Twelfth St., Rm. 134
Sub	sequent documents must be filed at the	e following location:	
	py of this notice must be served with th , a copy of this notice must be served o		endants (if a removal action is
		NOTICE TO COUNSEL	
=	=========		=======================================
P	all discovery related motions sho	uld be noticed on the calendar	of the Magistrate Judge
	notions.	ate Judge has occir designated	to near discovery related

Failure to file at the proper location will result in your documents being returned to you.

Los Angeles, CA 90012

Santa Ana, CA 92701-4516

Riverside, CA 92501

Case 2:11-cv-05447-SVW -JEM Document 1 Filed 06/30/11 Page 48 of 49 Page ID #:59 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL COVER SHEET									
I (a) PLAINTIFFS (Check box	if you are representing yourself		1	DEFEND	ANTS				
DAVID KAPLAN	, ,			BAXTE	R HEALTHO	ARE C	ORPORATION	J	
	I .				R HEALTHCA				
***			ì						
(b) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address and Telephone Number. If you are representing Att				Attorneys	(If Known)				
yourself, provide same.)	una a a a a a a a a a a a a a a			SESTE A F					
=	UEZ & CARLSON, LLP		SEYFARTH SHAW LLP						
-	J. / Wendy K. Shiff, Esq.			Jon D. Meer (SBN 144389) / Jonathan L. Brophy (SBN 245223 2029 Century Park East, Suite 3500)		
433 North Camden Dr	•				eles, Californ				
Beverly Hills, CA 902	210		II.	_	ne: (310) 277		7-3021		
Telephone: (310) 273	-0777		'	ciepnoi	16. (310) 27	-1200			
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VI. CAUSE OF ACTION (Cite t						. Do not c	ite jurisdictional sta	atutes unless diversity.)	
Wrongful termination and i		otion	al distress; 28 l	J.S.C. §	1332				
VII. NATURE OF SUIT (Place	an X in one box only.)							T	
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FOR OFFICE USE ONLY: C	Case Number:							·	-

AFTER COMPLETING THE FRONT SIDE OF FORM CV-71, COMPLETE THE INFORMATION REQUESTED BELOW.

Case 2:11-cv-05447-SVW - JEM Document 1 Filed 06/30/11 Page 49 of 49 Page ID #:60 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL COVER SHEET

VIII(a). IDENTICAL CASES: 11a If yes, list case number(s):	s this action been pr	eviously filed in this court an	nd dismissed, remanded or closed? 🔲 No 🗌 Yes				
VIII(b), RELATED CASES: Have If yes, list case mimber(s):	any cases been pre	viously filed inthis court that	t are related to the present case? 🛛 No 🗌 Yes				
□ c.	Arise from the sam Call for determinate For other reasons w	e or closely related transaction of the same or substantial would entail substantial duplic	ons, happenings, or events; or Ily related or similar questions of law and fact; or cation of labor if heard by different judges; or t, and one of the factors identified above in a, b or c also is present.				
IX. VENUE: (When completing the	following informat	ion, use an additional sheet if	f necessary.)				
(a) List the County in this District; Check here if the government	California County of its agencies or empl	outside of this District; State oyees is a named plaintiff. If	if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH named plaintiff resides. this box is checked, go to item (b).				
County in this District:*			California County outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country				
Los Angeles County							
(b) List the County in this District; Check here if the government,	California County of ts agencies or emplo	outside of this District; State oyees is a named defendant.	if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH named defendant resides. If this box is checked, go to item (c).				
County in this District:*	****		California County outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country				
			Baxter Healthcare Corporation is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in Illinois.				
(c) List the County in this District; Note: In land condemnation c	California County of ases, use the location	outside of this District; State i	if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH claim arose.				
County in this District:*		<u> </u>	California County outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country				
Los Angeles County							
* Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernar Note: In land condemnation cases, us	dino, Riverside, Vo	entura, Santa Barbara, or S etract of land inverved	San Luis Obispo Counties				
X. SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY (6		1 Min	Date June 30, 2011				
or other papers as required by law	CV-71 (JS-44) Civ v. This form, approv	ed by the Judicial Conference	nation contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings of the United States in September 1974, is required pursuant to Local Rule 3 -1 is not filed ing the civil docket sheet. (For more detailed instructions, see separate instructions sheet.)				
Key to Statistical codes relating to So	cial Security Cases:						
Nature of Suit Code	Abbreviation	Substantive Statement of	Cause of Action				
861	НІА	All claims for health insurance benefits (Medicare) under Title 18, Part A, of the Social Security Act, as amended. Also, include claims by hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, etc., for certification as providers of services under the program. (42 U.S.C. 1935FF(b))					
862	BL	All claims for "Black Lung (30 U.S.C. 923)	" benefits under Title 4, Part B, of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.				
863	DIWC	All claims filed by insured workers for disability insurance benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended; plus all claims filed for child's insurance benefits based on disability. (42 U.S.C. 405(g))					
863	DIWW	All claims filed for widows or widowers insurance benefits based on disability under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended. (42 U.S.C. 405(g))					
864	SSID	All claims for supplemental security income payments based upon disability filed under Title 16 of the Social Security Act, as amended.					
865	RSI	All claims for retirement (o U.S.C. (g))	old age) and survivors benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended. (42				

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CIVIL COVER SHEET

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